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AMERICAN INDIAN INTERES TS 
AND SUPREME COURT AGENDA SET TING 
1969-1992 October Terms 
JOHN R. HERMANN 
Trinity University 
A recent development in the judicial behavior literature on Supreme Court agenda setting is the 
examination of case selection within particular areas of the law. To that end, this study examines 
the Supreme Court's agenda-building process regarding American Indian Interests as a petition­
ing litigant during the 1969-1992 October terms. Using a multivariate logistic regression model, 
the findings indicate that judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model, the direct and 
third party briefs filed by the Solicitor General's office for and against American Indian interests, 
and the presence of a sovereignty issue were influential explanatory variables in the Supreme 
Court's case selection process. Contrary to the expectations of this study, however, the petitioning 
party alleging lower court conflict, dissension, and the number of amici curiae briefs filed in 
support of, and in opposition to, American Indian interests were not important predictors. 
One of the growing developments in the literature on agenda setting 
in the Supreme Court of the United States is the analysis of case selection 
within specific areas of the law. As McGuire and Caldeira (1993, 717) 
point out, "A great deal is known about how the Court, in general, 
selects cases .. . but next to nothing about how this winnowing takes 
place in particular areas of law." In this study, I seek to make a contri­
bution to that end by examining how the Supreme Court has chosen 
cases for its plenary agenda within the field of federal Indian law. 
More precisely, this study asks the question: How did American 
Indian interests fare before the U.S. Supreme Court as a petitioning 
litigant during the Burger and Rehnquist years (i.e., during the 1969-
1992 October terms)? I also attempt to discern those factors that 
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contributed to the success of American Indian interests before the 
Court as a petitioning litigant. To explain their success, the effects of 
seven explanatory variables are estimated: (a) the presence of the 
Solicitor General's office as a party for and against American Indian 
interests; (b) the presence of the Solicitor General's office as an amicus 
curiae on behalf of, and in opposition to, American Indian interests; 
( c) the presence of lower court dissension; ( d) the presence of the 
petitioning party alleging intercircuit court conflict; ( e) the presence 
of a sovereignty issue; (f) the number of amici curiae briefs filed by 
organized interests for and against American Indian interests; and 
(g) judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model. 
There are several reasons that American Indian interests' treatment 
by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts merits attention at the agenda­
setting stage. First, at least two justices from the Burger Court have 
placed great importance on cases involving American Indian interests. 
As one justice stated, "We now have three westerners on the Court and 
we are very concerned about ... Indian cases. And you can tell by our 
votes for cert. that we are interested in them" (Perry 1991, 261). Another 
justice stated, "Actually, I think the Indian cases are kind of fascinat­
ing. It goes into history and you learn about it, and the way we abused 
some of the Indians, we that is the U.S. government" (Perry 1991, 262). 
Second, cases involving American Indian interests are receiving 
more attention by the Court than ever before. The Supreme Court 
decided more cases involving American Indian interests-35-in the 
1970s than in any other previous decade in the Court's history (Wilkin­
son 1987, 2). In the 1980s, the Supreme Court decided more than 40 
cases involving issues critical to the interests of American Indians 
(Hermann 1994, 2). Indeed, the Court is more interested in cases in­
volving American Indian interests than many other types of cases. 
Although less than 5% of all petitions for certiorari win review, over 
20% of the 545 cases involving American Indian interests were granted 
plenary review by the Court during the 1969-1992 October terms. 1 
Third, given that American Indian activities are regulated primarily 
by the federal government (and not the states), the U.S. Supreme Court 
plays a particularly important role in the policy formation of Indian 
rights. Since the Marshal Court's decision in 1832, in Worcester v. 
Georgia (31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 515), the Court has usually held that "matters 
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affecting Indians in Indian country are thus as a general rule excepted 
from the usual application of state law" (Cohen 1982, 260). 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the concept of Supreme Court 
agenda setting has special significance for politically disadvantaged 
groups, including American Indian interests.2 If politically disadvan­
taged groups have little clout in majoritarian institutions, the courts in 
general, and the Supreme Court in particular, may be the last avenue 
for these groups to redress their grievances. 
EXPLAINING SUPREME COURT AGENDA SETTING 
Given that the Court does not offer any hard and fast guidelines for 
selecting cases for its plenary agenda,3 judicial scholars have at­
tempted to explain the Court's case selection process systematically. 
T he literature on Supreme Court agenda setting can be classified under 
two broad categories: cue theory and judicial attitudes as manifested 
by the attitudinal model (but, see Perry 1991; Provine 1980). 
CUE THEORY 
Cue theorists posit that the justices of the Supreme Court use cues 
as a means "for separating those petitions worthy of scrutiny from 
those that may be discarded without further study" (Tanenhaus et al. 
1963, 158). T he general idea behind cue theory is that the justices need 
a "quick and dirty way" of determining the certiorari-worthy cases. 
One of the most important cues in explaining the Court's decision 
to grant petitions for certiorari has been the presence of the Solicitor 
General's office as a petitioning litigant (Armstrong and Johnson 
1982; Salokar 1992; Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer, Hintze, and Kirk­
losky 1972). During the 1959-1989 October terms, for example, the 
Solicitor General's office was successful in seeking certiorari in 
approximately 70% of the 1,294 cases where it was a petitioning 
litigant (Salokar 1992, 25). As Tanenhaus et al. (1963, 160) point out, 
the attorneys in the Solicitor General's office "have the talent, the 
resources, and the experience to fully exploit the strong aspects of their 
cases, and in reply briefs to expose the most glaring weaknesses of 
their opponents." 
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In cases involving American Indian interests, the Solicitor Gen­
eral's petitioning briefs should play an especially important role in the 
decision-making calculus of the Court at the agenda-setting stage. The 
United States and American Indians have what is commonly called a 
fiduciary relationship, which "arises out of the constitutional plan to 
delegate plenary authority over American Indian affairs to the federal 
government and the duties undertaken by treaty and federal statute" 
(Cohen 1982, 651). Thus, in many cases involving American Indian 
interests, the Solicitor General's office acts as a trustee, as a direct and 
third party to protect American Indian rights. Given the special trust 
relationship between American Indians and the federal government, 
coupled with the fact that the Solicitor General's office as a petitioning 
party has been an important cue for the Court in determining its 
certiorari-worthy cases, one might anticipate that the Solicitor Gen­
eral's direct party briefs will significantly increase the chances that the 
Court will grant a case involving American Indian interests certiorari. 
In stark contrast, one might anticipate that the Court would be less 
inclined to grant the petition for certiorari in cases where the Solicitor 
General's office was a party in opposition to American Indian interests. 
The Solicitor General's office as petitioning third party is also 
examined in this study. Salokar (1992, 27), for example, found that 
the Court granted review in 88% of the cases where the Solicitor 
General's office filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the petition­
ing litigant. (In addition, see Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Caldeira and 
Wright 1990b; McGuire and Caldeira 1993.) On the basis of the salient 
role of the Solicitor General's office at the agenda-setting stage and 
the most impressive success rates of the office as an amicus curiae at the 
decision on the merits stage (i.e., Scigliano 1971; Salokar 1992), a 
reasonable expectation is that the Court will be more inclined to grant 
certiorari in cases involving American Indian interests where the 
Solicitor General's office filed an amicus curiae brief in comparison 
to when no such cue is present. Conversely, one might expect that the 
Court would be less likely to grant certiorari in cases where the 
Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief in opposition to granting 
certiorari. 
The presence of dissension and alleged intercircuit court conflict in 
the lower courts also have shown to increase the chances that the Court 
will accept a case for full review (Tanenhaus et al. 1963; Ulmer 1984).4 
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Chief Justice Fred Vinson, for example, considered dissension and 
conflict important criteria in determining the Court's decision to grant 
certiorari: "Our discretionary jurisdiction encompasses, for the most 
part, only the borderline cases-those in which there is a conflict 
among the lower courts or widespread uncertainty regarding problems. 
of national importance" (Tanenhaus et al. 1963, 161). Tanenhaus et al. 
(1963, 161) found that the Court granted approximately 13% of the 
petitions for certiorari in cases where a dissension cue was present 
during the 194 7-1958 October terms; in comparison, the Court granted 
certiorari in only 6% of the cases where no cue was present. The 
literature strongly suggests that the presence of dissension in the lower 
courts would increase the likelihood that the Court would grant 
certiorari in cases involving American Indian interests. In this study, 
dissension is defined in the tradition of the original cue theorists, 
Tanenhaus et al. (1963); that is, a petition where there is a disagree­
ment by the judges in the court directly below or where there is 
disagreement between two lower courts in the same case. In the former 
type of dissension, at least one judge on the court below had to dissent 
or concur. In the latter type, the court of appeals had to reverse the 
lower court decision. 
One might also reasonably anticipate that the alleged intercircuit 
court conflict cue might apply to cases involving American Indian 
interests. Petitioning attorneys perceive that discussing intercircuit 
court conflict in their briefs increases the chances that their petitions 
will be given plenary review by the Court (Ulmer 1984). This obser­
vation is also supported by comments from several staff attorneys at 
the Native American Rights Fund (NARF). When asked what ele­
ments make up a particularly good certiorari petition, one staff attor­
ney replied, "I get the Supreme Court rules out and the Supreme Court 
litigation book, Stern and Gressman . . . I look for the usual things, 
conflicts in the circuits" (Author interview; May 20, 1994). A former 
staff attorney at NARF remarked, "If there is conflict on an issue 
between the circuits, then I play that up as much as possible. Similarly, 
if the lower court is out of line with existing Supreme Court principles 
of law, I stress that fact" (Author interview; May 19, 1994). Caldeira 
and Wright (1988, 1120) confirm these attorneys' observations with 
quantitative data, concluding that "[E]vidently, the best advice for 
petitioning attorneys is to allege as many conflicts as possible." For 
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purposes here, alleged intercircuit court conflict is defined as any case 
where the petitioning party claims that there is conflict among or 
between the state supreme, federal circuit, or U.S. Supreme courts. 
The presence of certain issues, moreover, appears to increase the 
probability that the Court will give favorable treatment to a petition 
for certiorari. In particular, the presence of a civil liberties issue has 
been an important cue for the Court in determining its plenary agenda 
(i.e., Tanenhaus et al. 1963). Although civil liberties issues are ger­
mane to American Indian interests, they are not as critical as other 
issues. One basic and important issue confronting American Indian 
interests is sovereignty, the power oflndian tribes to regulate their own 
affairs without state and federal governmental interference (Cohen 
1982; Swagerty 1979; Wilkinson 1987). 
For purposes of this study, I expect that in cases where there is a 
sovereignty issue present, the Court is more inclined to grant petitions 
for certiorari in relation to when no such cue is present. Given that 
sovereignty issues define the role of American Indians and tribes in 
the American political universe, the Court might give these issues 
greater attention than many other ones. For greater conceptual speci­
ficity, sovereignty is defined here as an issue raised in a case involving 
governmental regulation of tribal affairs. This definition possesses two 
crucial characteristics. First, sovereignty issues only involve disputes 
in Indian country, not actions involving American Indians outside of 
Indian country. Second, the states or federal government would have 
to attempt to infringe on the rights of a citizen of a tribe or attempt to 
limit tribal autonomy; or, the tribal governments may try to extend 
their own jurisdiction over Indians or non-Indians in Indian country. 
Curiously, until recently the role of organized interests before the 
Court has been examined only at the decision-on-the-merits stage. 
Realizing the apparent void in the literature, judicial scholars have 
begun to examine the litigation activities of organized interests before 
the Court at the agenda-setting stage (Caldeira and Wright 1988, 
1990a, 1990b; McGuire and Caldeira 1993). In one study, Caldeira 
and Wright (1988, 1119) conclude that for the 1982 term the "more 
briefs filed [by organized interests ] in favor of certiorari in any given 
case, the better chances for plenary review." In addition, McGuire and 
Caldeira (1993) find that the number of amici curiae briefs filed by 
organized interests in support of a libertarian petition increased the 
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likelihood of the Court granting the case plenary review during the 
1957-1987 October terms. On the basis of these recent findings, one 
would expect that the more briefs filed by organized interests in favor 
of an American Indian petition, the more inclined the Court is to give 
the case its full attention. In this study, one might also anticipate that 
the more briefs filed against American Indian interests, the more 
inclined the Court is to deny the petition for certiorari. 
JUDICIALATIITUDES 
One of the unsettled controversies in the literature on Supreme 
Court agenda setting is whether judicial attitudes (as manifested by 
the attitudinal model) play an important role in Court decision making. 
Many political scientists (i.e., Palmer 1982; Schubert 1964; Ulmer 
1978) argue that the Court uses what judicial scholars commonly call 
the "error correcting" strategy.5 More precisely, the Court takes cases 
when it seeks "to 'correct errors' in the lower courts by voting to grant 
a hearing whenever a lower-court decision departed significantly from 
[its] most preferred doctrinal position" (Baum 1977, 14). Examining 
the 1933-1987 October terms, Pacelle (1991, 192) concludes that 
"members of the Court are also important entrepreneurs with policy 
goals derived from their values and attitudes. Justices use case selec­
tion and the agenda-building process to pursue these goals." 
In contrast, some judicial scholars opt for what this study calls the 
"quasi-legal" model. Adherents of the quasi-legal model (i.e., Provine 
1980; Perry 1991) argue that there are greater legal forces at work in 
the Court's case selection process that extra-legal models neglect to 
consider. This model takes its theoretical underpinnings from the 
words of Pritchett (1969). On commenting on the state of judicial 
politics, Pritchett (1969, 42) concluded that "again political scientists 
who have done so much to put the 'political' in political jurisprudence 
need to emphasize that it is still jurisprudence." 
Provine ( 1980, 172), for example, finds that "a shared conception 
of the proper role of a judge prevents the justices from exploiting the 
possibilities for power-oriented voting in case selection." Similarly, 
Perry argues that if the justices are not driven by some ideological 
predisposition to hear a particular case, they focus on legal factors 
using what he terms the "jurisprudential mode" (Perry 1991, 277-79). 
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In this study, I begin to resolve this continuing debate by attempting 
to discern whether judicial attitudes are important in explaining Court 
decision making at the agenda-setting stage for cases involving Ameri­
can Indian interests. To answer this question, judicial attitudes at the 
agenda-setting stage were measured by (a) taking all cases involving 
American Indian interests (as defined as such by U.S. Law Week) that 
were granted plenary review by the Court during the 1969-1992 
October terms, (b) determining the individual justices' support rates 
for these cases at the decision-on-the-merits stage,6 (c) creating a 
composite index of these support rates for each natural Court during 
the 1969-1992 October terms, and ( d) applying this ideological com­
posite index to the Court's decisions at the agenda-setting stage. For 
the justices' support rates in cases involving American Indian interests 
at the decision-on-the-merits stage during the 1969-1992 October 
terms and the coding procedures used, see Appendix A. 
The new measure of judicial attitudes used here appears to be 
justified because many scholars long have suspected that the Court's 
votes on petitions for certiorari are a tentative indicator of the Court's 
votes at the decision-on-the-merits stage (i.e., Schubert 1964; Ulmer 
1972). As Boucher and Segal (1995, 824) point out, "Long before 
terms such as 'backward induction' became part of the parlance of 
political science, Schubert (1959, see N) asked what strategies jus­
tices would take on certiorari voting if they wished to achieve their 
policy goals on the merits." 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
The 303 certiorari petitions filed involving American Indian inter­
ests as the petitioning party during the 1969-1992 October terms were 
located in U.S. Law Week.1 Each certiorari petition involving an issue 
critical to American Indian interests was then examined in The United 
States Records and Briefs on microfiche to determine whether (a) the 
Solicitor General's office filed a direct party brief in support of, or 
against, American Indian interests; (b) the Solicitor General's office 
filed a third party brief in favor of, or in opposition to, American Indian 
interests; ( c) dissension was present within and between lower courts; 
( d) the petitioning party alleged a conflict; ( e) a sovereignty issue was 
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present; and (f) the number of amici curiae briefs filed by organized 
interests in support of, and against, American Indian interests. For 
greater conceptual specificity of how this study operationalized the 
explanatory variables, see Appendix B. 
The Court's support rates at the agenda-setting stage are computed 
by dividing the number of cases that the Court supported American 
Indian interests over the entire population of cases. In cases where the 
parties were Indian versus Tribe, the tribe is coded in favor of Ameri­
can Indian interests. This coding scheme advances the position that 
the community interest outweighs the individual interest. To explain 
the relative influences of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variable (1 if certiorari were granted; 0 otherwise), a logistic regres­
sion model is used. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
As evidenced by Table 1, the Court supported American Indian 
interests as the petitioning party in 17% of the cases at the agenda­
setting stage during the 1969-1992 October terms. As Table 1 also 
indicates, the logistic regression model offers moderate explanatory 
power. The model correctly explains 88% of the cases. Five of the 11 
variables included in the model are important determinants in explain­
ing Court decision making in cases involving American Indian inter­
ests at the agenda-setting stage. (See Appendix C for the descriptive 
statistics of the explanatory variables.) 
As anticipated, American Indian interests have clearly benefited in 
cases where the Solicitor General's office represented them as a direct 
party. What is more helpful to the success of American Indian interests 
at the agenda-setting stage is the decision of the Solicitor General's 
office to file an amicus curiae brief in support of their position. 
Surprisingly, the Court is not less inclined to deny petitions for 
certiorari in cases where the Solicitor General's office filed amici 
curiae briefs in opposition to American Indian interests. As expected, 
however, the Court is less likely to grant petitions for certiorari in cases 
where the Solicitor General's office was a direct party against Ameri­
can Indian interests. Overall, the Solicitor General's position as a 
direct and (usually) as a third party had important influence on the 
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TABLEl 
Logistic Regression Model for Explaining the Success 
of American Interests Before the U.S. Supreme Court 
at the Agenda-Setting Stage: 1969-1992 October Terms 
Estimated Coefficient/ 
Variable 
Solicitor General as a party on behalf of 
American Indian interests 
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae on 
behalf of American Indian interests 
Solicitor General as a party against 
American Indian interests 
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae 
against American Indian interests 
Dissension within a lower court 
Dissension between lower courts 
Alleged conflict 
Sovereignty issue 
Number of amici curiae briefs filed on 
behalf of American Indian interests 
Number of amici curiae briefs filed 
against American Indian interests 
Judicial attitudes 
N=303 
Constant: -6.54 
-2 log likelihood: 203.836 
Goodness of fit: 331.339 
Coefficient 
1.63*** 
2.59*** 
-1.01 *** 
-0.21 
0.71 ** 
0.21 
0.44 
0.80*** 
0.28 
0.68* 
0.67*** 
Model chi-square: 73.602; statistical significance: .00 
Mean of dependent variable (Court's support rate): 17.2% 
Percentage predicted correctly: 87.75% 
SE SE 
0.61 2.67 
0.59 4.39 
0.50 -2.02 
0.79 -0.27 
0.42 1.69 
0.77 0.27 
0.42 1.05 
0.40 2.00 
0.24 1.16 
0.52 1.31 
0.33 2.03 
NOTE: When coefficient/SE is 2 or more, the relationship has reached a significance level of 
.05 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989, 33). 
*p < .10, one-tailed test. **p < .05, one-tailed test. ***p < .01, one-tailed test. 
Court's decision to grant or deny petitions for certiorari. As Salokar 
( 1992, 25) notes, 
As the attorney for the United States, the Solicitor General has available 
a large pool of possible certiorari requests and selects only a small 
number of cases that will most likely meet the standards of the Court 
in granting review and, subsequently result in a decision favoring the 
government. 
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Thus Ivers and Parker's (1993, 1) conclusion that the Solicitor Gen­
eral's office "is the E.F. Hiltton of organizational interests-when it 
speaks, the Court's listens" appears to be correct. Given the prominent 
role of the Solicitor General's office in the Supreme Court's universe, 
it comes of little surprise that the success of American Indian interests 
as a petitioning litigant largely depended on the support of the office's 
direct and (usually) third party briefs. 
The presence of a dissension cue does not appear to be an important 
determinant for the Court in selecting its cases for plenary review. It 
is clear that the Court is not more likely to grant petitions for certiorari 
in cases involving American Indian interests where there was at least 
one concurring or dissenting opinion in the decision directly below or 
where an appellate court reversed a lower court's decision. 
Alleged conflict is also not an important cue for the Court in 
selecting its cases involving American Indian interests. Given that the 
Court considers conflict among and between lower courts as an 
important criterion for its case selection, most petitioning attorneys 
are naturally going to allege conflicts where they might not actually 
exist. As Caldeira and Wright (1994, 15) note, "Of the petitions for a 
writ of certiorari, about 6% in 1982 and 11 % in 1968 contained real 
conflict, and about 60% in 1982 and 52% in 1968 set forth an alleged 
conflict." Thus, in many instances, the petitioning attorney may have 
alleged conflict where an actual conflict did not exist. 
As hypothesized, the presence of a sovereignty issue is an important 
cue for the Court in determining its plenary agenda in cases involving 
American Indian interests. Sovereignty issues are an integral part of 
the field of federal Indian law because they define the relative roles 
that the federal government, states, municipalities, and tribes play in 
the regulation of American Indian affairs. Put simply, sovereignty 
issues define the status of tribal governments in the political and legal 
universe. 
Contrary to the expectations of this study, the number of amici 
curiae briefs filed in support of, or in opposition to, American Indian 
interests does not significantly increase the likelihood that the Court 
would grant or deny the case plenary review, respectively. This finding 
contradicts the findings of others. Caldeira and Wright ( 1988, 1122), 
for example, find that "interested parties can have a significant and 
positive impact on the Court's agenda by participating as amici curiae 
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prior to the Court's decision on certiorari or jurisdiction." The findings 
here may indicate that using the number of amici curiae briefs may 
not always be an appropriate measure. Some groups' amici curiae 
briefs may hold greater weight with the Court than those of others. 
The Solicitor General's briefs, for example, are usually more respected 
by the Court. The same may hold true for certain groups' amici curiae 
briefs, as the attorneys' experiences and their reputation for filing 
quality briefs with the Court may influence Court decision making at 
the agenda setting. It is possible that the importance of filing amici 
curiae briefs with the Court may be dependent on who files the briefs, 
not how many briefs are filed in each case. 
Judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model were also 
a strong predictor of the Court's decisions in American Indian cases 
at the agenda-setting stage. The composite index of the justices' 
support rates at the decision-on-the-merits stage in cases involving 
American Indian interests was a useful measure for explaining Court 
decision making at the agenda-setting stage. This finding may offer 
support for those scholars (i.e., Ulmer 1972) who suspect that the 
Court's decision to grant or deny petitions for certiorari is inextricably 
linked to the Court's votes at the decision-on-the-merits stage. 
What is perhaps more important, the method created here to mea­
sure judicial attitudes tentatively indicates that the attitudinal forces 
that govern decision making at the decision-on-the-merits stage may 
also apply to the agenda-setting stage, at least for the case of American 
Indian interests during the 1969-1992 October terms. Segal and Spaeth 
(1994, 11), however, suggest that 
the institutional rules and incentives that allow Supreme Court justices 
to engage in attitudinal decision-making in votes on the merits simply 
do not apply in full to other courts or to other stages of the Supreme 
Court's processing of cases .... But nothing in the attitudinal model, 
which was developed explicitly to explain the decision on merits, 
requires these factors to be sole explanations of the justices 's behavior 
at other stages. 
Although attitudinal decision making is not the sole explanation in 
Court decision making at the agenda-setting stage, it may wield more 
influence than initially recognized. These findings may indicate that 
judicial scholars may have to rethink the influence of the role of the 
attitudinal model at the agenda-setting stage. 
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CONCLUSION 
Researchers long have examined groups that tum to the courts when 
they lack access or clout in the electoral process (Cortner 1968; 
Lawrence 1990; O'Connor 1980; Shattuck and Norgren 1979; Vose 
1959). Curiously, unlike at the decision-on-the-merits stage, there is 
not much scholarly attention devoted to the litigation activities of 
politically disadvantaged groups before the U.S. Supreme Court at the 
agenda-setting stage (but see Lawrence 1990). 
The concept of Supreme Court agenda setting is particularly impor­
tant for politically disadvantaged groups, including American Indian 
interests. If politically disadvantaged groups have little clout in ma­
joritarian institutions, the Supreme Court may be the last forum for 
these groups to redress their grievances. Before politically disadvan­
taged groups can redress their grievances before the Supreme Court, 
however, they first must gain access. Given that over 95% of all 
petitions for certiorari fail to win plenary review from the Court and 
that the Court has virtually full discretion over its docket, gaining a 
hearing before the Supreme Court is a difficult hurdle to clear. 
In this study, I examine the litigation activities of a politically 
disadvantaged group at the agenda-setting stage that have not garnered 
much scholarly attention in judicial politics; that is, American Indian 
interests during the 1969-1992 October terms. As anticipated, most of 
the traditional cues variables also apply to the Court's case selection 
process for petitions filed involving American Indian interests. The 
direct and (usually) third party briefs filed by the Solicitor General's 
office in favor of or in opposition to are the among the most important 
cues in determining the Court's case selection process. The presence 
of a sovereignty issue also positively and significantly influenced the 
Court's agenda-building process. 
Contrary to the expectations of this study, the petitioning party 
alleging lower court conflict, dissension, and the number of amici 
curiae briefs filed in support of, and in opposition to, American Indian 
interests are not important predictors of the Court's case selection 
process in cases involving American Indian interests. In the case of 
the alleged lower court conflict cue, many of the conflicts that existed 
may have been tolerable and, thus, may not have warranted the Court's 
immediate attention. In many instances, the petitioning attorney's 
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perception of an alleged conflict may not have been the same as the 
Court's. When controlling for all of the other explanatory factors, dis­
sension was not an important predictor of the Court's agenda-building 
process. 
The number of amici curiae briefs filed in support of, and in 
opposition to, American Indian interests may not have been an impor­
tant determinant in the Court's case selection process because raw 
numbers alone may not be an appropriate measure for the influence 
of organized interests. The quality of the amicus curiae brief filed and 
the Court's respect for certain groups' briefs may be more valid 
measures in determining the influence of organized interests at the 
agenda-setting stage. 
Judicial attitudes as manifested by the attitudinal model is an 
important predictor of the Court's agenda-building process in cases 
involving American Indian interests. The new measure takes the 
justices' support rates at the decision on the merits stage and applies 
them to the agenda-setting stage. This finding may indicate that the 
justice's vote at the agenda-setting stage may be a tentative vote for 
the decision-on-the-merits stage. What may be more important, the 
same attitudinal forces that govern Court decision making at the 
decision-on-the-merits stage may also apply at the agenda-setting 
stage, at least for the case of American Indian interests during the 
1969-1992 October terms. This leaves the question: Can the Court's 
agenda-building process for other groups or interests be explained by 
the same attitudinal forces that explain American Indian interests? 
More scholarly attention is needed before political scientists will have 
an adequate answer to this question. 
Justices 
Douglas 
Marshall 
Brennan 
APPENDIX A 
The Justices' Support Rates for American Indian Interests 
at the Decision-on-the-Merits Stage: 1969-1992 October Terms 
Support Rates (NJ 
0.94 (16) 
0.76 (70) 
0.74 (68) 
Blackrnun 0.63 (72) 
Stewart 0.55 (38) 
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Justices Support Rates (N) 
Burger 0.50 (58) 
Harlan 0.50 (2) 
Powell 0.45 (56) 
White 0.43 (75) 
Souter 0.40 (5) 
O'Connor 0.36 (36) 
Stevens 0.33 (58) 
Rehnquist 0.30 (71) 
Scalia 0.25 (16) 
Thomas 0.25 (4) 
Kennedy 0.10 (10) 
Black 0.00 (3) 
SOURCE: Coding scheme: The 82 full opinion cases regarding American Indian interests 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court were identified in U.S. Law Week and examined in the U.S. 
Reports. Each case was coded as decided by the justices as for or against American Indian 
interests. Seven cases were excluded from analysis because they were split decisions; that is, the 
Court and the justices affirmed and reversed on the central issues in the case, leaving a population 
of 75 cases. Success rates were computed by dividing the number of cases in which each 
individual justice supported American Indian claims over the total population of cases. For the 
coding of judicial attitudes in this study, see Appendix B. 
Dependent variable 
APPENDIX B 
Coding of the Variables 
If the Court grants the petition for certiorari, 1; otherwise, 0. 
Explanatory variables 
If the Solicitor General's office is a direct party on behalf of American Indian interests, 1; 
otherwise, 0. 
If the Solicitor General's office is a direct party in opposition to American Indian interests, 
1; otherwise, 0. 
If the Solicitor General's office files an arnicus curiae brief on behalf of American Indian 
interests, 1; otherwise, 0. 
If the Solicitor General's office files an arnicus curiae brief in opposition to American Indian 
interests, 1; otherwise, 0. 
If lower court dissension is present, 1; otherwise, 0. 
If the petitioning party alleges intercircuit court conflict, 1; otherwise, 0. 
If a sovereignty issue is present, 1; otherwise, 0. 
The number of amici curiae briefs filed by organiz.ed interests on behalf of American Indian 
interests (ordinal variable ranging theoretically from 0 to infinity). 
The number of amici curiae briefs filed by organized interests in opposition to American 
Indian interests (ordinal variable ranging theoretically from 0 to infinity). 
The ideological composite index for each natural Court could range theoretically from 0 
(completely conservative) to 9 (completely liberal). Each justice's support rate could 
theoretically range from 0 (no support) to 1 (complete support). The support rates were 
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obtained by taking all cases that were granted plenary review by the Court during the 
1969-1992 October terms (as defined as such by U.S. Law Week). Each full opinion case 
was examined in the U.S. Repons to determine if each individual justice supported the 
position advocated by American Indian interests at the decision-on-the-merits stage (1 if 
the justice sided with American Indian interests; 0 otherwise); per curiam cases and 
summary dispositions were excluded from the analysis. The justices' support rates for the 
1969-1992 October terms were then added for all of the justices who served on each 
natural Court. The composite index for each natural Court was then applied to the 
agenda-setting stage. 
APPENDIX C 
Descriptive Statistics of the Explanatory Variables 
Minimum Maximum 
Variable M SD Score Score 
Solicitor General's office as a party on 
behalf of American Indian interests 0.05 0.22 0 
Solicitor General's office as an 
amicus curiae on behalf of 
American Indian interests 0,07 0.27 0 
Solicitor General's office as a party 
against American Indian interests 0.44 0.50 0 
Solicitor General's office as an amicus 
curiae against American Indian interests 0.04 0.19 0 
Dissension within the lower court 0.18 0.38 0 
Dissension between lower courts 0.19 0.39 0 
Petitioning party alleging conflict 0.62 0.49 0 
Sovereignty issue 0.34 0.47 0 
The number of amici curiae briefs filed 
on behalf of American Indian interests 0.28 0.77 0 7 
The number of amici curiae briefs filed 
against American Indian interests 0.06 0.29 0 3 
Judicial attitudes 4.47 0.61 3.05 5.30 
Number of cases (N): 303 
NOTES 
1. Cases involving American Indian interests are those defined as such by U.S. Law Week. 
These cases include American Indian interests as the petitioner as well as the respondent. 
2. Although American Indian interests are truly a disadvantaged minority in terms of a sense 
of powerlessness, numbers, racial or cultural characteristics, and a sense of group solidarity, their 
status as citizens in separate tribal nations gives them a unique political status that is different 
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from that of other politically disadvantaged groups. Thus the relationship between the United 
States and Indian tribes is also a political one. 
3. Although the Court does not (usually) offer any reasons for granting or denying an 
individual petition for certiorari, Rule 10 of the U.S. Supreme Court Rules offers some guidance 
for petitioning attorneys, namely, in cases where there are intercircuit court conflicts between 
U.S. courts of appeals or state courts on a federal question, or in cases where a lower court has 
"so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings ... to call for an 
exercise of this Court's power of supervision." Rule 10, however, is minimized by its introductory 
paragraph, which stipulates that "a review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of 
judicial discretion .... The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered." 
4. Ulmer ( 1984) defines two types of intercircuit court conflict, alleged and real. Although 
there has been a general consensus among scholars on how to conceptualize alleged intercircuit 
court conflict, there is little agreement on an operational definition of real intercircuit court 
conflict. Feeney ( 1975, 305), for example, defined intercircuit court conflict as a "case in which 
the decision below deals with the same explicit point as some other case and reaches a 
contradictory result. Feeney's definition included conflicts involving federal district courts, state 
courts, or circuit courts (1975, 304). In a subsequent study, two former Supreme Court law clerks, 
Estreicher and Sexton, narrowed the operational definition of real intercircuit court conflict to 
contradictions in "decisions by state courts of last resort or federal courts of appeals" (1984, 
1010-11). Still, Ulmer's definition includes only "cases involving conflict with Supreme Court 
precedents or conflicts in the [federal] circuits" (1984, 182). To magnify the problem further, 
many real intercircuit court conflicts need to percolate longer in the lower courts before the U.S. 
Supreme Court will decide the issues on their merits (O'Brien 1990, 215; Perry 1991, 230). In 
addition, whether it truly exists depends on one's interpretation of what "real conflict" is. Thus, 
given the several measurement problems associated with operationalizing real intercircuit court 
conflict, it was excluded from the analysis. 
5. Although judicial scholars have applied the "error correcting" strategy most often to the 
agenda-setting stage, other theories have been examined. Among others, the "prediction" and 
the "majority" strategies have shown moderate explanatory power in predicting the Court's case 
selection process. Adherents of the prediction strategy posit that there is a positive nexus between 
a justice's decision to grant certiorari and being part of the winning coalition at the final vote. 
Advocates of the majority strategy hold that the justices will vote more often to grant certiorari 
when they part of the ideological majority on the Court. For extended discussions of these 
strategies, see Baum (1977), Brenner and Krol (1989), Boucher and Segal (1995), Krol and 
Brenner ( 1990), and Palmer ( 1982). 
6. In this study, I specifically chose not to use the Spaeth database because in the Spaeth 
data American Indian cases are operationalized as those cases where American Indians are a 
party. In this study, in contrast, I examine all cases that had an impact on American Indian interests, 
including those cases where the federal government is a party on behalf of American Indian 
interests. In addition, in this study I purposely do not use the ideological values created by Segal 
and Cover (1989) because "some scholars of the Court have attempted to push the Segal/Cover 
scores beyond their intended limits, along the way stretching (and, perhaps, surpassing) the range 
of reliability and validity of the measures" (Epstein and Mershon 1996, 262). Segal and Cover 
are mindful to caution future use of their ideological measure, which was almost exclusively 
designed to examine cases involving civil rights and civil liberties issues. In contrast, American 
Indian cases involve issues regarding federalism, taxation, judicial power, federal and state 
preemption, natural resources, and so on (e.g., see Hermann and O'Connor 1996). For a more 
detailed discussion of the validity and reliability problems associated with using the Segal and 
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Cover ideological scores in cases not exclusively using civil rights and civil liberties issues, see 
Epstein and Mershon (1996). 
7. A list of these cases is available by contacting the author. 
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